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Research ICT Africa
The debate over the regulation of termination rates in Europe concluded in 2009 with the 
recommendation by the European Commission to national regulators to reduce termination rates 
to the cost of termination of an e"cient operator. The debate in Africa is ongoing. This paper seeks 
to contribute to these debates by locating them in the context of Africa.
The most common argument made to support above-cost termination rates is that termination 
revenues are used to extend networks to under-serviced areas or to subsidise retail prices for 
access and usage. Operators making these claims have argued that a reduction in termination 
rates will force them to drop subsidies on handsets and calling prices, which will lead to lower 
subscriber numbers, and that it will be the poor in particular who will be cut o!. 
However, termination rates around the world are falling, while subscriber numbers have 
continued to grow and retail prices continued to drop. Empirical evidence suggests that aligning 
termination rates with the cost of an e"cient operator in a Calling Party’s Network Pays (CPNP) 
set-up will increase competition in the sector and allow operators to compete more fairly. This will 
serve consumer welfare and, indeed, the wider economy. 
This paper argues that:
• above-cost termination rates e!ectively subsidise subscribers of one network at the 
expense of subscribers of another network;
• above-cost termination rates shield larger mobile operators from competition from 
smaller operators;
• cost-based termination rates increase competition between operators and lead to lower 
prices, more subscribers and more investment in networks and services;
• there is no empirical evidence of the so-called ‘waterbed e!ect’ whereby prices reduced in 
one component automatically result in price increases in another component. It assumes 
that pricing strategies of all mobile operator are the same, and as such are based on 
revenue replacement rather than profit maximisation;
• mobile termination is a monopoly and not one side of a two-sided market; and
• whether lower termination rates will lead to lower retail rates for all operators depends on 
the competitive pressure in the sector. If not further regulatory interventions may be 
required to ensure that price reductions are passed through to end users.
The case of Namibia is presented as an example of termination rate benchmarking as an 
alternative regulatory strategy to overcome regulatory and institutional bottlenecks in Africa.. An 
interconnection dispute was resolved within nine months by benchmarking the cost of 
termination of selected countries. The subsequent termination rate reductions led to increased 
competition, lower retail prices, higher subscriber numbers and increased EBITDA margins and 
profits for the incumbent mobile operator. The Namibian example further provides an empirical 
case to demonstrates that there is not automatic’ waterbed e!ect’ with the reduction of wholesale 
prices resulting in a automatic increase in retail prices to recover lost revenues.
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Call termination is a monopoly. While call origination can be made competitive in numerous ways, 
there is simply no alternative to terminating a call on the network of the operator who owns the 
number a caller is trying to reach. The basis of regulation of this monopoly service is that 
termination rates should be based on the costs of an e"cient operator so that interconnecting 
operators, and ultimately end users, would not have to bear the costs of an ine"cient operator. For 
many years, there has been a debate about which costs should be included in the calculation of 
the cost of termination, with net interconnection receivers arguing for high and net payers for low 
termination rates. In support of high termination rates dominant mobile operators have argued 
that:
• mobile termination is a two-sided market and lowering termination rates will lead to 
increases in access and usage prices, leading to fewer people being able to a!ord 
communication services. This is also referred to as the ‘waterbed e!ect; and
• lower termination rates and resultant lower profits will limit operators’ capacity to invest.
This paper demonstrates that:
• there is no automatic e!ect (waterbed e!ect) inherent in the reduction of termination rates. 
Operators adjust retail prices to maximise profits in response to the specific competitive 
conditions of the market they operate in;
• the e!ect of high termination rates is that subscribers from one network subsidise 
subscribers of another network. There is no inflow of funds into the sector, just a transfer 
between operators;
• larger networks can use higher termination rates to prevent smaller networks from gaining 
market share, inhibiting competition. High termination rates imply high o!-net call rates, 
since termination rates are wholesale cost for o!-net-calls, limiting o!-net calling prices 
downwards. High termination rates and subsequent high o!-net calling prices make it 
expensive for a consumer to move from a large network to a smaller network, since the 
ratio of o!-net to on-net calls made and received will increase through the switch and with 
it the cost for the switcher. Making more o!-net calls than before increases the cost due to 
o!-net prices being higher than on-net prices. Receiving more calls from other networks 
increases the indirect cost, the cost of being called from other networks. This may lead to 
being called less and having to call back more often, depending on user profiles;
• cross country econometric studies do not explain pricing behaviour of operators following 
regulatory interventions. Only detailed country case studies can deliver that;
• termination rates and on-net retail prices are not interdependent, i.e. call termination is not 
one side of a two-sided market;
• o!-net prices and termination rates are not interdependent but dependent, i.e. there is cost 
causation; and
• Lowering termination rates to the cost of an e"cient operator does not lead to higher retail 
prices and a drop in mobile subscribers. It has the potential to increase competition 
between operators and lead to lower retail prices and more mobile subscribers.
There is overwhelming international evidence that high termination rates encourage neither 
competition nor a!ordable pricing. In the next section the arguments made above are presented 
together with recommendations arising from them. Subsequent sections deal with the so-called 
‘waterbed e!ect’ and the two-sided market argument. The Namibian interconnection 
benchmarking study is then discussed in detail to demonstrate how benchmarking can help 
developing countries to regulate a crucial competitive bottleneck, while developments else where 
in Africa are referred to more generally. 
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Termination Rate Debate
The European Commission issued a draft recommendation on the regulatory treatment of fixed 
and mobile termination rates in October 2008 (EU, 2008), which sparked an EU-wide debate. The 
final recommendation, issued on 7 May 2009, incorporated comments by operators and regulators 
across Europe and recommended the following to European regulators (EU, 2009):
• Cost of E!cient Operator: National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) should set termination 
rates at the cost of an e"cient operator. This implied symmetric termination rates.
• LRIC: Cost of termination should be calculated on the basis of forward-looking long-run 
incremental costs (LRIC), only taking into account costs that are caused by the provision of 
wholesale call termination, i.e .wholesale call termination being the increment.
• Definition of incremental costs: Costs that can be avoided if a specific service is no longer 
provided, i.e. wholesale voice termination service provided to third parties.
• Definition of tra!c related costs: Fixed and variable costs which increase with increased levels 
of tra"c.
• Top-Down Addition: NRAs may use a top-down approach based on audited cost data to 
improve the bottom-up LRIC.
• Next Generation Network (NGN): The core part of both mobile and fixed networks should be 
based on NGN, and the access part for mobile networks should be a combination of 2G and 
3G.
• Asymmetric termination rates: “In cases where it can be demonstrated that a new mobile 
entrant operating below the minimum e"cient scale incurs higher per-unit incremental 
costs than the modelled operator, after having determined that there are impediments in 
the retail market to market entry and expansion, the NRAs may allow these higher costs to 
be recouped during a transitional period via regulated termination rates. Any such period 
should not exceed four years after market entry.” (EU, 2009).
NRAs are required to implement symmetric termination rates based on the cost of an e"cient 
operator. Altogether, the recommendation is likely to lead to termination rates between 1 and 2 
Euro cents by the end of 2012 across the EU. Predictably, the recommendation has been applauded 
by new entrants and small operators, supported by national regulatory authorities and objected to 
by mobile incumbent operators with significant market power.
In response to the initial draft recommendations, Frontier Economics (2009) composed a report for 
several of Europe’s mobile incumbents, concluding that the EU draft recommendation would lead 
to MTRs which are below the e"cient cost of termination for three reasons:
• the cost of coverage is considered non-incremental to the provision of wholesale 
termination services;
• termination costs exclude common costs; and
• the recommendation confuses the costs of a hypothetical operator with the costs of an 
e"cient operator.
These arguments are flawed for several reasons. Firstly, common costs that are associated with the 
e"cient provision of termination services are included. Only common costs that are not required 
for providing termination services are excluded. Secondly, total termination revenue typically 
comprise a relatively small share of total revenues, around 10-20%.1  Operators do not build 
networks and provide coverage to terminate calls, but to provide services to their customers and 
gain new customers. Coverage cost can therefore not be seen as part of termination cost. Further, 
providing termination services is also a service to a network’s own customers since being able to 
call other networks and being able to receive calls from other networks is a benefit to these 
subscribers. Lower termination rates therefore increase the utility of the network to its subscribers, if 
passed on to these subscribers or to subscribers to other networks. Above-cost termination rates 
could mean that subscribers subsidise their own on-net calls with their o!-net calls made or 
received. Thirdly, Frontier Economics (2009) argues that the LRIC costs proposed by the EU are not 
those of an e"cient operator but rather of a hypothetical operator with costs that will be lower 
than those of an e"cient operator. Whether or not this  is the case depends on the implementation 
of the LRIC model and the data available from operators.
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1 For the financial year ending in 2008: MTC Namibia 11.2%, Leo Namibia, 9.8%, Telecom Namibia, 
6% (NCC, 2009), Vodacom South Africa, 2009: 18.2% (Vodacom, 2009)
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Figure 1: UK MTR vs. subscribers per 100 inhabitants (source: OVUM and ITU 2008)
An earlier Frontier Economics report for incumbent mobile operators, (2008), investigates the likely 
consequence of drastically reduced MTRs below e"cient cost termination rates. It concludes that 
consumers would not be better o! and that subscription levels would drop due to higher retail 
prices: The lower level of subscription is the result of higher retail prices, as the cost of incoming 
calls are not covered by termination revenues.” However, no one proposes to set termination rates 
below the cost of terminating calls e"ciently, and the historical evidence clearly contradicts 
Frontier’s claim. MTRs have come down in Europe for the last 10 years and countries have not 
experienced lower subscription levels, nor reduced call volumes, nor increased retail prices Even 
countries that used zero termination rates (for example France) did not witness a decline in 
subscriber numbers (see Figure 2), or lower usage.
Figure 2: Mobile Subscribers per 100 inhabitants in France (ITU 2008)
In fact, the opposite has been the case. Lower mobile termination rates were accompanied by 
growing subscriber numbers and tra"c. Figure 1 demonstrates this for the UK for mobile 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants and MTRs in US cents.
It is possible that the number of active SIM cards could drop due to a lowering of mobile 
termination rates if that reduces the need to own two SIM cards due to excessive o!-net call prices. 
However, that would only reduce the number of active SIM cards and not the actual number of 
users. Incumbent operators have been eager to report on SIM cards and not on subscriber numbers 
for this reason.
Table 1 shows that retail prices have not increased following termination rate reductions, but have 
instead decreased. All 21 countries had lower termination rates in 2009 compared to 2006 and all 
21 countries had lower retail prices in 2008 compared to 2006. Table 1 underestimates retail price 
reduction though, since the OECD price basket methodology only captures the prices of dominant 
operators. Only operators that have 50% market share or more are included. If no single operator 
has 50% market share then the biggest operators that together constitute 50% of the market are 
chosen. Dominant operators have, however, the least incentive to reduce tari!s. New entrants that 
need to gain market share are more likely to pass the cost savings from lower termination rates on 
to their subscribers in the form of lower o!-net call prices.2
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2 See table 7 for a comparison of 18 African countries.
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Table 1: Changes in mobile low-usage basket prices compared to changes in MTR (Source: OECD 2007; 

































Austria 193.43 148.26 0.1121 0.04 77% 36%
Belgium 175.51 146.92 0.1397 0.087 84% 62%
Denmark 68.82 50.31 0.1134 0.0737 73% 65%
Finland 99.89 60.31 0.079 0.0502 60% 64%
France 239.68 216.49 0.098 0.0476 90% 49%
Germany 123.55 104.55 0.1139 0.0676 85% 59%
Greece 302.47 202.46 0.1248 0.0786 67% 63%
Hungary 230.48 217.08 0.1071 0.0589 94% 55%
Iceland 142.61 117.61 0.1212 0.0784 82% 65%
Ireland 202.95 149.95 0.1054 0.0964 74% 91%
Italy 233.39 195.23 0.122 0.0822 84% 67%
Luxembourg 112.84 107.59 0.14 0.0898 95% 64%
Netherlands 119.63 105.02 0.114 0.094 88% 82%
Norway 111.2 86.72 0.0885 0.0664 78% 75%
Poland 209.79 147.94 0.1352 0.0398 71% 29%
Portugal 178.44 153.8 0.1171 0.0661 86% 56%
Slovak 
Republic
255.4 241.62 0.1046 0.099 95% 95%
Spain 258.02 250.8 0.1131 0.0569 97% 50%
Sweden 87.92 77.69 0.0783 0.0297 88% 38%
Switzerland 145.11 111.03 0.1515 0.1124 77% 74%
UK 170.53 160.4 0.087 0.0563 94% 65%
Only when dominant operators begin to lose subscribers to the new entrant in large numbers are 
they likely to reduce prices. This pass-through, or the lack thereof, is also used as an argument 
against lowering termination rates to the cost of an e"cient operator (Sandbach, 2007b). The 
argument is: why lower termination rates if the cost saving is not passed on to the consumer 
anyway? The answer to that is twofold. Firstly, termination rates at the cost of an e"cient operator 
remove the subsidy3  from one operator to another. Secondly, if cost savings are not passed on then 
further regulatory remedies might be required to increase competition within the sector, such as 
retail price regulation.
Another pass-through is the one from high mobile termination rates to lower mobile on-net rates. 
This pass-through has, however, rarely been discussed. The extra profit from high termination rates 
could be used up for operational ine"ciencies, high profit margins and high salaries for managers 
of mobile operators. If high termination rates would be subsidising on-net call rates for the poor, as 
is often claimed by incumbent operators, why are prepaid on-net rates not then cheaper than 
postpaid on-net rates? Also, on-net rates are usually not below cost and therefore not subsidised 
(making a profit for each minute). 
Several empirical studies have recently been published that indicate that lowering MTR will indeed 
lead to more usage through lower retail prices. (See for example Growitsch et al, 2010). Ofcom 
(2010) released a market review stating that it is confident that pure LIRC as the basis for 
termination rates will be positive for consumers by promoting competition and reducing call prices.
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3 The transfer from net termination payers to net termination payment receivers; the subsidy dominant 
operators claim they use to subsidise lower access and usage prices.
Only when dominant 
operators begin to lose 
subscribers in large 
numbers to the new 
entrant are they likely 
to reduce prices
The next section discusses the two-sided market and the waterbed e!ect arguments which are 
related this discussion.
The Two-Sided Market Argument
Mobile call termination is frequently interpreted as one side of a two-sided market that produces a 
‘waterbed-e!ect‘ whereby adjustments to pricing in one market automatically create pricing 
e!ects in another. The two-sided argument is used by those operators benefiting from high 
termination rates and rejected by those who are net payers. However, any of the two sided market 
models fails to predict market outcomes correctly and waterbed e!ects cannot be empirically 
observed following termination rate cuts. Evans (2007) states that two fundamental principles apply 
for price setting in two sided markets:
• interdependent prices: Prices are determined interdependently, i.e. changing the price for the 
one side will change the price of the other side; and
• no cost causation: There is no direct link between incremental costs for a good or service 
and the price. 
Neither can be theoretically or empirically shown, as is demonstrated below. Various arguments are 
used for call termination being a two-sided market, each with weaknesses (see table 2). The 
Sandbach (2007a) and Evans (2007) arguments ignore the fact that an operator has only limited 
influence over the price other operators can charge for calls to their network. If networks A and B 
agreed to a termination rate x, then B could charge any amount, x+a, to its subscribers. B could in 
theory price calls to A so high that A receives very little termination revenue from B. A would hence 
not be able to subsidise retail prices for its subscribers through termination revenues. Setting 
termination rates would restrict o!-net prices of competitors downwards to a certain extent, but 
not upwards. Price elasticity for calls from other networks is a function of the o!-net prices of other 
networks, which may or may not be influenced by termination rates. Tra"c between networks 
depends on several factors, many of which an operator cannot control, such as user profiles, market 
share and the o!-net prices of the other operators. However, assuming that A could cause a net 
flow in interconnection fees from B and uses that to subsidise retail prices for its subscribers, what 
then happens to B’s subscribers? Could the mobile telecommunication market be two-sided for 
one operator and one-sided for another? Could the two-sidedness change over time? Both 
positions can clearly be rejected.
Table 2: Two-sided market definitions












services to own 
subscribers
Prices = on-net, o!-




base for users of 
other networks
Prices = MTR
Operator has little control over calls 
received from other networks due to o!-
net prices of other networks and user 
profiles of own and other network users
Subscriptions:
access price = 
handset + Sim
Outgoing Services:
price = retail prices
Definition ignores that access price is 
once-o! and usage prices change 
frequently
Mobile subscribers Fixed-line callers Operator has little control over calls 
received from fixed-line network since it 
has little influence over retail prices of 
fixed-line operator. MTR only defines 
downward barrier.
Hausman & Wright (2006) define the one side of the market as mobile and the second side as fixed-
line subscribers. In a Calling Party Pays environment (Africa and Europe) subscribers do not pay for 
receiving calls. Here again an operator cannot set prices for the second side of the market. It has 
little influence over the price of the fixed-line operator. The CentrePiece (2007) defines access as 
one side and usage as the second side of a two-sided market, ignoring that access is a once-o! 
price and usage a price that changes frequently, which excludes inter-dependability.
Assuming for a moment that there is a two-sided market based on the definition of Sandbach 
(2007a) and Evans (2007):
• Market A: Retail services (prices: on-net, o!-net, fixed-line, peak, o!-peak etc.)
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• Market B: Mobile call termination (price MTR)
The first argument as to why that might be a two-sided market is that high termination rates 
subsidise access for poor users. Since termination rates have decreased all over the world, while 
subscriber numbers have increased, the opposite e!ect to the one predicted by two-market theory 
has in fact transpired (Figure 1). The second argument is about prices, whether higher prices on the 
one side of the market dictates a lowering of prices on the other side. Here too the opposite of 
what has been predicted has been the case. Lower termination rates were not followed by 
increases in retail prices but by decreases (Table 1). Observed subscriber numbers and prices clearly 
speak against two-sided markets.
Call termination is a complex matter with competitive consequences for the performance for the 
sector. However, the key business principle of selling high volumes cheaply, or lower volumes 
dearly, applies. As Growitsch et al (2010) noticed, MTRs represent wholesale revenue as well as 
wholesale cost. Lower MTRs will lead to lower o!-net prices for new entrants and smaller mobile 
operators, which will reduce their o!-net prices to compete with the on-net prices of dominant 
operators to gain market share. That will lead to more termination tra"c for the dominant mobile 
operators. Dominant mobile operators are likely to prefer to keep o!-net prices high (sell dearly) 
since it entails the hidden benefit of protection from competition. High MTRs mean high o!-net 
retail rates for small operators, which makes it expensive to move from a larger to a smaller operator 
since this will tilt the relationship between on-net and o!-net calls.
In a classical case of two-sided markets, Valletti (2006) gave the example of newspapers that can sell 
their newspapers more cheaply to gain a larger readership and then sell the advertising space more 
dearly. However, the advertising market is competitive for both readership and advertisers and the 
price is being driven by demand and supply. The larger the readership the more a newspaper will 
be able to charge advertisers.
That is not true for call termination, where the prices are fixed though contracts. There are no 
equilibrium termination prices since they are determined by contracts between operators and only 
change if regulators intervene or if all operators benefit from changing them. Each interconnection 
agreement can be seen as a pareto-e"cient equilibrium. Operator A cannot be better o! without 
operator B being worse o!, no matter how economically ine"cient the interconnection 
arrangement is. An operator cannot simply increase the MTR because its subscriber base grew. Also, 
advertisers not only have the choice between various daily newspapers, but also weekly ones and 
monthly magazines and can even choose to advertise on TV or radio instead. Some newspapers 
can further charge high advertising fees despite a small readership due to the average income of 
the readers, as in the case, for example of the New Yorker. Mobile termination is a monopoly and 
callers cannot choose on what network a call needs to be terminated when calling a particular 
person. 
This can be illustrated further by continuing with the Sandbach (2007a) definition and assuming a 
situation with two mobile operators. Mobile operator A has a market share of 80% and operator B 
of 20%. Reducing MTRs to the cost of an e"cient operator could have the following outcome: 
Mobile Termination Benchmarking: The Case of Namibia
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the sector
• Operator B reduces its o!-net prices to make it more attractive for subscribers of A to move 
to B, while maintaining its profit margin by passing on the reduction in MTR to its 
subscribers. This will also generate more outgoing calls to A subject to the price elasticities 
of B’s subscribers.
• Operator A can pass on the cost saving in termination rates or keep o!-net prices constant. 
In the latter case the profit from each outgoing minute increases. Outgoing tra"c will 
increase should the operator drop its o!-net rates, subject to the price elasticity of A’s 
subscribers.
Table 3: Operator A’s choices if B drops o!-net prices





Passes MTR reduction on to 
subscribers = lower o!-net 
prices
Keeps o!-net prices 
unchanged
More tra"c from B (more minutes at cost)
More tra"c to B (more minutes, same profit margin)
More tra"c from B (more minutes at cost)
Same tra"c to B (same minutes, higher profit margin)
Operator A has the choice to make more money on each minute of outgoing calls and to sell the 
same as before or maintain its profit margin for outgoing calls and sell greater volumes. The 
disincentive to leave the larger and join the smaller network is reduced through lower termination 
rates and lower o!-net rates of operator B. Why should A now increase its on-net rates? It would 
provide even greater incentive for its subscribers to move to B. Which option operator A chooses, 
whether it will be more profitable to pass on the cost saving in termination to its subscribers or to 
benefit from higher profit margins for outgoing calls, will depend on many market factors and 
strategic considerations. A key factor will be the attractiveness of operator B for subscribers of 
operator A. Should operator A lose customers to operator B in large numbers it could opt to reduce 
its o!-net rates as well or even its on-net rates. Should operator B still be unattractive for subscribers 
of operator A (lack of number portability, lack of coverage etc.) then operator A would most likely 
not change any of its prices. In that case the higher profit margin from outgoing calls would 
compensate for the lower termination rate.
Table 4: Outcome matrix for two operators following a MTR cut when decisions are limited to raising, 
cutting or keeping on-net and o!-net retail prices unchanged
On-net
Operator A






















However, this example represents only the simplest case. Any decision reacting to a drop in MTR 
would depend on the market share of operators, customer composition, regulatory environment 
and many other factors. The complexity increases exponentially when adding fixed-line operators 
and more mobile operators. Pro-competitive regulatory interventions like local loop unbundling, 
national roaming, infrastructure sharing and number portability will equally increase the complexity 
exponentially. This can be demonstrated with an outcome matrix for two mobile operators. In this 
example the decision each operator has to take is to either increase or decrease or keep prices 
constant for o!-net and on-net calls following a MTR cut. This highly simplified scenario already has 
81 potential outcomes (see table 4). Adding a third mobile operator would lead to 729 outcomes. 
Adding fixed-line operators, and hence another set of prices, several products for each operator for 
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which prices are set individually, and allowing price increments in percentage steps again pushes 
the number of possible outcomes up exponentially. Strategists within operators are likely to deal 
with that complexity with gut feeling and play it by ear, adjusting as the consequences are being 
observed.
The two-sided market argument, other then predicting market outcomes incorrectly, does not 
contribute to understanding such complexities. A game theoretical approach would be more 
suitable. However it is likely to predict the obvious: Cost-based termination rates increase the 
competition between operators and hence lead to lower retail prices, more subscribers and more 
investment – particularly in cost saving and/or service-enhancing technologies.
It is also possible that cost-based termination rates do not increase competition between operators 
and that retail prices remain entirely una!ected. Such an outcome could be the case in a country 
with mobile operators of equal market size and exchange of tra"c.
Increasing retail prices would only be conceivable for an operator that is a net receiver of 
termination payment and which may already be operating at a loss. Such an operator could 
increase retail prices to limit further losses. This would, however, likely seal the operators fate.
The key argument why MTR is not one side of a two-sided market is because MTRs and retail prices 
are not interdependent. Telecommunication operators sell a variety of products and services, retail 
and wholesale. MTRs are not interdependent with retail prices for several reasons:
• Termination rates are not prices that are being set to maximise profits, but are contractual 
arrangements that are unlikely to change unless regulators intervene or it is in the interest 
of all parties involved to change them. 
• An operator cannot increase MTR because its market share increased, something that 
would be suggested from the newspaper example of two-sided markets above. 
Termination rates are mostly symmetrical between mobile operators, and if they are 
asymmetrical due to regulatory intervention, then the smaller network can charge more. 
Symmetrical termination rates contradict the two-sided market argument as the larger 
network gets the same nominal value as the smaller network.
• MTRs are wholesale costs and wholesale revenue at the same time. MTR reductions can be 
passed on to subscribers, which leads to a decrease in o!-net prices. Should it not be 
passed on then the operator makes more money for each outgoing minute compensating 
for the loss in the termination revenue through the MTR reduction. These are concrete 
choices an operator can make depending on which it thinks will be maximising profits.
• Products of mobile operators are complex and operators have many products and di!erent 
o!-net, on-net, peak, o!-peak, SMS, MMS and data prices for each product. The MTR is just 
one price, maybe two prices (peak and o!-peak). Operators will maximise their profits, and 
pricing strategies are complex and driven by user profiles, market niches and not by 
revenue replacement. Reducing prices may well lead to more revenue and increasing 
prices to less revenue following mobile termination rate cuts.
• Operators can set only their own retail prices and not those of other operators. Yet, the 
others’ o!-net prices will influence how many calls are being received.
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Reducing end user 
prices may well 




The Waterbed E!ect Argument
A result of a two-sided market and an argument that is often put forward to maintain the status 
quo is the waterbed e!ect.4  5  The waterbed e!ect describes a situation whereby if mobile 
termination rates go down, some other prices, usually usage and access prices, need to go up, to 
replace the loss in termination revenue. However, this ignores the fact that operators can increase 
or decrease prices depending on what maximises their profit. Which strategies maximise profits 
depends on many factors, such as market share of operators, strategy and price elasticity to name 
just a few. It is far too simplistic to assume that the reduction in regulated prices will automatically 
mean increasing prices in other areas.
The ‘waterbed e!ect’ argument denies the fact that mobile operators have choices. It would make 
more sense for an operator to increase operational e"ciency and to invest into cost-reducing 
technologies than to increase tari!s and hence reduce tra"c on its network, for example. The 
waterbed e!ect further hypothesises that all operators react in the same way, indulging in revenue 
replacement, and are not profit-maximisation. Considering two operators, one a net termination 
payer and one a net termination revenue receiver. It is obvious that their reaction in relation to 
pricing strategy will be very di!erent. Termination rates based on the cost of an e"cient operator 
will mean that ine"cient operators will need to adjust their business models in order to become 
more e"cient. Hiking retail tari!s will be last on the list.
Table 5: Predicted vs. actual outcomes of termination sate reductions
Access & Usage Prices Subscriber Numbers
Predicted outcome
Actual outcome
go up go down
go down go up
Concern has been raised that forcing prices down in regulated segments might lead to higher 
prices in unregulated segments of the market. This too is unlikely since the unregulated segments 
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4 See for example Centre Piece (2007): “Pressing down prices in one part of a firms’ operation causes 
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5 Sandbach (2007c) states that a optimal MTR would at least need to be twice the termination cost 
due to the waterbed e!ect.
Forcing down prices 
in regulated 
segments does not 
lead automatically 
to higher prices in 
unregulated 
segments of the 
market
are likely to be unregulated because they are competitive. It is conceivable that an operator would 
be able to increase subscription prices linked to new handsets, not transparently reducing the 
handset subsidy. however, its doubtful that such a move would maximise profits in a competitive 
environment. In any case, fear of excessive pricing in one segment is not reason enough to allow 
excessive pricing in another.
Genakos & Valletti’s (2009 and 2007) argument regarding increasing retail prices following MTR 
reductions is contrary to the evidence (see Figure 1 and Table 1). Neither access nor usage prices 
increased in response to MTR reductions in the EU. In fact the opposite transpired. Increased 
competition brings down access and usage prices as MTRs approach the cost of an e"cient 
operator. The findings of Genakos & Valletti (2009 and 2007) are more likely due to weaknesses in 
the data used.6  The data shortcomings and unsuitability of cross-section country analysis are 
discussed in another section.
Another argument put forward is that the waterbed e!ects exists but is masked by other 
developments such as increased competition and decreasing unit costs and can hence not be 
observed with the naked eye. The question that arises from that is why any policymaker should pay 
attention to the waterbed e!ect if it is so limited that one needs advanced econometric techniques 
to find it. A more appropriate argument might be: if termination rates had not been reduced, prices 
would have fallen and subscriber numbers increased even further. Evidence for that cannot come 
from cross country comparisons however, but only from detailed country studies. One would need 
to analyse price changes for periods without regulatory interventions and for periods after MTR 
reductions controlling for many other factors. Key would be to estimate the increase in competitive 
pressure through lower termination rates by analysing how various operators react to lower MTRs 
in their pricing and product strategies.
The Subsidy Argument
Two di!erent forms of potential subsidisation that result from high mobile termination rates need 
to be di!erentiated. One is between operators and one between services of an operator. 
Cross-subsidising retail with wholesale services
The claim underlying the ‘waterbed e!ect’ and the two-sided market arguments is that wholesale 
service charges are used to subsidise retail services. Cross-subsidisation of retail services with 
wholesale services is claimed, by those propagating the ‘waterbed e!ect’ and the two-sided market 
argument, to be substantial. A key argument against the waterbed e!ect lies in the nature of cross 
subsidies. Claiming that on-net rates are being subsidised by termination revenue would imply that 
on-net rates are being o!ered below cost. Cross-subsidising implies that one service is o!ered 
below cost and that another service is priced high enough to compensate for losses sustained 
through the subsidised service. This might be the case in some instances; free o!-o!-peak on-net 
calls for example. The cross subsidisation taking place in this example is more likely to be from peak 
on-net rates however. 
An operator claiming that it has to raise prices if termination rates are being reduced has to answer 
why, if it is profit maximising, it has not done so already if it can. Incumbent operators are unlikely to 
increase on-net rates, they would have done so already if they could and if that would have 
increased their profits. Price elasticity and competition are likely to reduce revenues further should 
an operator increase on-net rates to compensate for termination revenue. 
Another factor rendering this type of service cross subsidy unlikely is that termination revenue 
usually makes up only a small share of total revenue. How would 10-20% of revenue subsidise 
80-90% of revenue? Further, if an operator receives a net termination payment and uses that for 
cross-subsidising other services, what are the net payers doing?
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6 Relying on OECD data, ie. prices of only dominant operators, might be one source of error. A further problem 
might be that available data for econometric analysis is insu!cient to explain pricing behaviour of operators 
following regulatory interventions. Price elasticity for specific subscriber segments, price transparency in the 
market, the existence of number portability, number of operators and sequencing of market entry, past 
regulatory interventions, and strength and credibility of regulators are among many factors that are likely to 
influence product design of operators. Further distortions may stem from changing exchange rates. A OECD 
basket may have become cheaper or more expensive not because of price changes but because of a 
fluctuation of the exchange rate since OECD baskets are being expressed in US$.
High MTRs are intra sector transfers (subsidies) between operators
As Genakos & Valletti (2009) point out, the financial benefit from high termination rates constitutes 
a subsidy from the fixed-line network to the mobile network or from one mobile network to 
another mobile network. Which network is a net receiver of termination revenue depends mainly 
on market size, customer composition, retail prices of all operators involved and the level of fixed 
and mobile termination rates. 
High mobile termination rates mean not only that fixed-line subscribers subsidise mobile 
subscribers, but also that mobile subscribers from one network subsidise mobile subscribers from 
other networks. Worse, new entrants, who still have to build extensive networks, subsidise mobile 
operators, usually incumbent, which have amortised network infrastructure and achieved high 
economies of scale. To justify allocation, based on consumer welfare arguments, from one operator 
to another, or from subscribers of one operator to the subscribers of another operator, one would 
need to prove that the transfer would in fact increase welfare. Subsidising one group of subscribers 
at the expense of another set of subscribers makes no sense. The standard investment related 
argument with regard to the waterbed e!ect is equally implausible. The subsidisation that results 
from high termination rates is within the sector. Why should one operator be given a subsidy to role 
out network infrastructure at the expense of other operators? Allowing highly profitable mobile 
operators to be subsidised by fixed-line subscribers has contributed to the decline of fixed-line 
phone penetration in Africa. High MTRs mean that it is expensive to call mobile phones from fixed-
line phones, another reason for fixed-mobile substitution. Yet fixed-line networks are of importance 
for Africa, particularly for the provision of a!ordable broadband Internet access, and should not 
simply be sacrificed for sky-high EBITDA margins of dominant mobile operators.
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Table 6: Key arguments for termination rates based on the cost of an e"cient operator






Dominant mobile operators can use high MTRs to 
defend their market share against new entrants. High 
MTRs imply high o!-net rates for new entrants and small 
operators, making it expensive for a subscriber to 
change from the larger to the smaller network. A 
dominant mobile operator can also starve smaller 
mobile operators and fixed-line operators by combining 
high MTRs with high o!-net and fixed-line retail charges, 
causing net interconnection outflows.
Large operators can no 







The Genakos & Valletti (2009 and 2007) papers 
demonstrate that EBITDA margins may be a!ected by 
lower termination rates, which is to be expected since 
lower termination rates increase competition and lead 
to lower, not higher retail prices. EBITDA margins of 
operators that were shielded by high termination rates 
from competition are naturally bound to decline under 
competitive pressure. However, in Namibia the opposite 
has been the case. The EBITDA margin of the incumbent 
operator increased from 50.9% to 53.8% and its 
subscriber base increased by more than 25% due to 
lower prices which continued to expand the market in 
2009 after a significant termination rate cut (43%).
The average profit in 
the industry is likely to 
either be una!ected or 
to increase. Fairer 
competition may lead 
to lower prices and 
expansion of the 
market. Operators that 
built a business model 
around high 
termination rates will 
need to adjust to 
maintain profitability.
No guarantee 
of a pass 
through from 
high MTR to 
on-net rates
A pass through from high mobile termination rates to 
lower mobile on-net rates (service cross subsidisation) is 
rarely discussed. The extra profit from high termination 
rates could be used up for operational ine"ciencies, 
high profit margins and high salaries for managers of 
mobile operators. If high termination rates would be 
subsidising on-net call rates for the poor, as often 
claimed by incumbent operators, why then are prepaid 
on-net rates not cheaper but more expensive than 
postpaid on-net rates? Also, on-net rates are usually not 
below cost and cannot therefore be subsidised.
O!-net rates are 
typically higher than 
on-net rates. That no 
longer needs to be the 
case once the 
termination rate is set 
to the cost of an 
e"cient operator, 
removing a potential 











Doubts about the pass through from lower termination 
rates to retail prices is used as an argument against 
lowering termination rates (Sandbach, 2007b). The 
argument is: why lower termination rates if the cost 
saving is not passed on to the consumer anyway? The 
answer to that is twofold. Firstly, termination rates at the 
cost of an e"cient operator remove the subsidy from 
one operator to another. Secondly, if cost savings are not 
passed on then further regulatory remedies might be 
required to increase competition within the sector.
Whether fixed-line and 
mobile operators 
change their o!-net 
prices depends on the 
competitive pressure in 
the sector. Further 
regulatory interventions 
might be required. A 
suitable intervention 
would be to set o!-net 
equal to on-net prices 
once MTRs are at cost 
of termination.
Termination is 
a service to 
own 
subscribers
Providing termination services is also a service to 
operators’ own customers since being able to call other 
networks and being able to receive calls from other 
networks is a benefit. This implies that a high MTR 
reduces the value the operator provides to its own 
subscribers by making and receiving calls to other 
networks more expensive.
Operators receive the 
cost of termination for 
their service while 
providing a service to 
own customers (being 
able to receive calls 
from other networks).
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Case Study vs Cross Country Study
The ‘waterbed e!ect’ is a theoretical concept and has not been documented empirically. Nor has 
there been any convincing evidence that call termination is one side of a two-sided market. The 
empirical studies analysing a panel of countries used to justify this argument produce questionable 
results for several reasons:
• Mobile penetration rates and mobile retail prices in a country depend on many factors such 
as number of fixed and mobile operators, sequence of market entry, technologies 
deployed, market share of operators, user profiles of subscribers, brand loyalty, contractual 
lock-ins and club e!ects, price elasticity of demand, income elasticity of demand, levels of 
disposable income, business models used by operators, penetration of substitute 
technologies like fixed-line and cable TV, past regulatory interventions and their sequence,, 
regulatory strategies, communication laws and policies and many other social and 
economic factors. Constructing data sets with enough data points to account for such 
diversity is impossible. This is acknowledged by the CEG (2009) study.
• Most studies investigating the impact of MTR reduction on retail prices use the OECD 
price baskets methodology, which only captures the retail prices of dominant operators 
(or of those that together constitute 50% market share). Examples for such studies are CEG 
(2009) and Genakos & Valletti (2009). Including smaller operators would indicate price 
changes following regulatory interventions better. Dominant operators are likely to 
change retail prices at a slower pace, if at all. New entrants that need to gain market share 
are more likely to pass through termination rate savings to their subscribers, in particular 
since this brings their o!-net prices closer to the on-net prices of dominant operators. 
Table 7 provides an example of the di!erence in e!ective mobile prepaid prices for usage 
baskets defined by the OECD (OECD, 2006) for dominant operators compared to the 
cheapest available in a country. It shows that the smaller operators can be as much as 
60% cheaper compared to the dominant operator. 
• The Genakos & Valletti (2009 and 2007) papers demonstrate that EBITDA margins may be 
a!ected by lower termination rates, which is to be expected since lower termination rates 
increase competition and lead to lower, not higher, retail prices, though tra"c may 
increase as a result. EBITDA margins of operators that were shielded by high termination 
rates from competition are naturally bound to decline under competitive pressure. Lower 
EBITDA margins following MTR cuts do not constitute proof of a waterbed e!ect. Nor do 
lower EBITDA margins of operators from one country compared to EBITDA margins of 
operators from another country based on the level of MTR.
• Omitted variables may render models invalid: An example is the paper by Sandbach and 
Hooft (2009), which tries to estimate the impact of telecommunication policies on mobile 
penetration and usage without including prices in its models. Including prices, which are 
undoubtedly significant factors in explaining access and usage in economic theory, could 
lead to changes in significance levels and coe"cients, or even signs of coe"cients.
The CEG (2009) study, commissioned by Ofcom based on cross country comparison, also delivers 
questionable results7. First, it intends to contribute to the “debate about the relative performance of 
the Calling Party Network Pays (CPNP) and Bill and Keep (B&K) charging regimes in delivering better 
outcomes to consumers particularly with regards to retail prices, usage and the take-up of mobile 
services.” Yet CPNP and B&K are not mutually exclusive. France has a CPNP regime and until 2003 
B&K as well. The comparison should rather have been between CPNP and RPNP. On the data side, 
the final data set only has 3% of data points from a country practicing B&K – the USA – out of 146 
observations. This is not enough to draw any conclusion about the di!erences between the two 
billing systems. 
A panel data model based on operators rather than at the  country level could potentially deliver 
better results. Such an approach would need to incorporate all operators of a country. This would 
increase the data available by a factor of three or four and allow to include significant explanatory 
variables such as market share and year of market entry into the model. The waterbed e!ect is a 
hypothesis about the pricing strategies of operators and as such need to be tested at the operator 
level. 
A less econometrically sophisticated but more plausible method would, however, be to look into 
specific cases. Did Vodafone UK increase its retail prices after any MTR reduction in the UK? And 
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pressure
how did the smaller operators or the net-interconnect-payers react? CPNP vs. RPNP could have 
been better studied using India, which changed from RPNP to CPNP, as a case study. 
The next chapter presents a case study of Namibia which  analyses prices for all operators and all 
products after MTR reductions.. It demonstrates that rather than resulting in increase enduser rates 
to recover their losses, - the so called ‘waterbed e!ect’ - the lowering termination rates by the 
regulator increased competition in the sector and led to lower retail prices and more subscribers.
Table 7: Cheapest prepaid product in a country compared with cheapest prepaid product from 
dominant operators for OECD usage baskets (2006 definition) for 18 RIA countries (Source: 
www.researchictafrica-data.net)
Cheapest prepaid 
product in the country in 
USD
Cheapest prepaid product 
from dominant operators
Di!erence 













Low User Medium 
User
High User
% USD % USD % USD
Botswana 5.04 10.28 20.67 5.04 10.28 20.67 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00
Ethiopia* 3.74 7.59 14.98 3.74 7.59 14.98 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00
Mozambique 7.45 15.07 29.88 7.45 15.07 29.88 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00
Senegal 6.12 12.31 24.25 6.12 12.31 24.25 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00
South Africa 7.64 15.38 29.63 7.64 16.12 33.13 0% 0.00 5% 0.74 11% 3.50
Tunisia 5.06 10.24 20.19 5.06 10.24 20.19 0% 0.00 0% 0.00 0% 0.00
Zambia 6.57 13.28 25.99 6.60 13.54 26.37 0% 0.03 2% 0.26 1% 0.38
Cameroon 8.59 16.42 30.45 9.30 17.91 33.22 8% 0.71 8% 1.49 8% 2.77
Uganda 6.33 12.90 24.05 6.95 13.90 26.85 9% 0.62 7% 1.00 10% 2.80
Burkina Faso 11.04 22.65 45.19 12.54 25.98 52.52 12% 1.50 13% 3.33 14% 7.33
Côte d’Ivoire 7.00 14.34 28.88 8.15 16.34 31.59 14% 1.15 12% 2.00 9% 2.71
Ghana 2.29 4.36 8.01 3.04 6.10 12.16 25% 0.75 29% 1.74 34% 4.15
Benin 4.92 11.05 24.75 7.50 14.74 27.84 34% 2.58 25% 3.69 11% 3.09
Kenya 3.35 6.37 11.42 5.93 11.82 22.78 44% 2.58 46% 5.45 50% 11.36
Namibia 5.06 10.74 22.19 8.96 18.27 36.19 44% 3.90 41% 7.53 39% 14.00
Rwanda 3.74 7.94 16.59 6.87 13.63 26.45 46% 3.13 42% 5.69 37% 9.86
Nigeria 3.63 7.58 15.48 7.76 15.85 32.13 53% 4.13 52% 8.27 52% 16.65
Tanzania 2.93 6.06 12.24 7.26 15.24 31.84 60% 4.33 60% 9.18 62% 19.60
* Ethiopia only has one operator
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Namibian Benchmarking Case Study
This section describes how benchmarking was used to resolve a termination rate dispute in 
Namibia. First, the process followed in Namibia is described, followed by sections on regulatory best 
practice, termination rate trends and cost of termination. The Namibian termination rate case which 
is then discussed examines the impact on prices, subscriber numbers and profitability of the mobile 
incumbent operator.
Benchmarking
Benchmarking termination rates is the process of establishing interconnection rates based on cost 
of termination in other jurisdictions. Undertaking full forward-looking cost modelling is challenging, 
expensive, time-consuming, and often requires information that is not available in developing 
countries.8  The cost of termination for a country incorporates all country-specific characteristics. 
Benchmarks may need to be adjusted for several country-specific factors such as population 
density, local area size, extent of urbanisation, tra"c patterns and call durations, input prices, scale 
economies, exchange rates and taxes. Whenever countries or operators seem similar, there are 
always enough factors that are di!erent to expose the selection to criticism. In terms of population 
density Australia and Namibia are very similar, but in terms of average household income, labour 
and site cost, and tra"c patterns the two countries are very di!erent. It is therefore crucial to get 
the cost of termination for a wide selection of countries.
Process
Following a dispute about interconnection charges between Namibian telecommunication 
operators, a consultative workshop on interconnection models was hosted by the Honourable 
Minster of Information and Communication Technology Joel Kaapanda on 13 October 2008 in 
Windhoek. The outcome of the workshop was an agreement amongst operators that 
benchmarking was the preferred approach to determine interconnection rates prescribed by the 
regulator when operators fail to agree. The Namibian Communications Commission commissioned 
Research ICT Africa (RIA) to do the study. 
The termination rate benchmarking needed to be conducted within the legal and regulatory 
framework of Namibia that pertained at the time. The Communications Act 8 of 2009 was not 
enacted at the time of the dispute and the termination rate could only be regulated through the 
licences of the two mobile operators, Leo and MTC. Clause 20.1c of these licences required 
termination rates to be cost-based: 
"provide interconnection in a timely fashion on terms, conditions (including technical 
standards and specifications) and cost-based rates that are transparent, reasonable, having 
regard to economic feasibility, and su!ciently unbundled so that the interconnecting party 
does not pay for network components or facilities that it does not require for the service to 
be provided, it being understood that no unreasonable and unrecoverable costs will be 
imposed on the Licensee in connection with any unbundling."
The final study benchmarked adopted international best practice, termination rate trends and 
termination cost data available to derive an interconnection model.9  Various interconnection 
models were discussed with operators. In an iterative process operators were asked to submit their 
comments in writing to the Namibian Communications Commission (NCC). The final consensus 
solution was only reached after the completion of the study.
Regulatory Best Practice and Termination Rate Trends
Namibia used the European Union (EU) and selected African countries as benchmark for regulatory 
best practice and termination rate trends. Three conditions were required for the selection of 
countries. The billing system needed to be based on Calling Party’s Network Pays (CPNP), countries 
needed already to have implemented, or to to have been in the process of implementation cost-
based termination rates, and data needed to be available. 
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The EU recommendation (EU, 2009) along with the guidelines on interconnection arrangements for 
members of the East African Community issued by the East African Regulatory, Postal and 
Telecommunications Organisations (EARPTO, 2008) served as a basis for establishing the regulatory 
best practice. Termination rate reductions towards the cost of an e"cient regulator along a glide 
path were established as key best practice elements for CPNP countries.
Figure 3: MTR Trends in Euro cents (Source: ERG, Ofcom, ARCEP, RTR, FICORA)
Table 1 and Figure 3 demonstrate actual and announced termination rate reductions. Generally, 
MTRs are still far away from cost of termination in Europe and elsewhere. The international trend for 
mobile termination rates is towards the cost of an e"cient operator. Austria and France see this at 
between 1 and 2 Euro cents (N$/ZAR 0.12 to 0.24). 
Figure 4: Ofcom’s Proposed MTRs (UK pence per minute -2008/09 prices)
Figure 4 shows the proposed MTR model of Ofcom (2010) for the UK. Ofcom estimates that the cost 
of termination based on a pure LRIC model would drop to 5 UK pence (0.055 ZAR/N$) by 2014 due 
to increases in data volume and a decline in costs of network equipment with the spread of 3G 
technology. 
International comparisons indicated that Namibia’s mobile termination rates were very high at the 
beginning of 2009 (Figure 5). Additionally, MTR trends point to rates in CPNP countries falling 
rapidly towards the cost of an e"cient operator.
Figure 5: Mobile termination rates in N$/ZAR compared (annual average exchange rate for 2008)
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Generally mobile 
terminate rates are 
far away from the 
cost of termination
Cost of Termination
The previous section demonstrated how heterogeneous mobile termination rates are across 
Europe and Africa. The trend is towards termination rates that are equal to the cost of an e"cient 
operator, but most European countries will only get there in 2011 or later. Another aspect is taking 
into account country-specific cost factors. Looking at termination rates in Europe tells us very little 
about the link between population density and termination rates, for example, let alone cost of 
termination.
Figure 6: Population density plotted against mobile termination rates (source ERG)
Figure 6 shows that there is no correlation between population density and MTRs in Europe. 
Countries like Sweden and Finland, which have among the lowest population densities, are also 
among the five countries with the lowest MTR. Population density is not correlated to MTRs and 
might not even be correlated to the cost of termination. Some costs are lower in rural areas, e.g. 
wages, larger cell sizes and less costly tra"c management. Costs may be higher in many African 
countries than in Europe because of equipment prices, which are often subject to import duties/
taxes, but other costs may be lower, such as labour and site costs.
Constructing cost-based termination rates therefore requires costs to be benchmarked. Cost data is 
very di"cult to come by and most regulators and operators consider it highly confidential. Cost 
data from Austria, Sweden, Tanzania, Australia and France were made available by regulatory 
authorities to the Namibian Communications Commission for its 2009 benchmarking study (NCC 
2009). These needed to be brought into the Namibian context. 
MTC, Namibia’s incumbent mobile operator, chose not to provide any cost data to the NCC, while 
Telecom Namibia and Leo provided the requested information. A rough estimate based on tra"c 
information provided by MTC and its annual report was used as a common sense check as to 
whether the cost benchmarks from other countries would be applicable to Namibia. Table 6 
presents these estimates. For Leo and MTC the direct costs and depreciation, as indicated in the 
2008 financial statement, were divided by the total call volume. An estimate of the cost termination 
is 50% of that figure, since every call consist of termination and origination.
Table 8: Estimates of the cost of termination in Namibia based on annual reports and cost and tra"c 




Direct cost in N$ ‘000 as per information provided to NCC 155,456
Direct cost and depreciation in N$ ‘000 as per annual report 77,962 371,219
Total minutes 537,141 31,914 775,819
Direct cost and depreciation per minute in N$ 0.29 2.44 0.48
Estimated termination cost (50% of direct cost and 
depreciation per minute)
0.14 1.22 0.24
MTC is, following the definitions used in the EU, the most e"cient mobile operator in Namibia. Leo’s 
cost of termination was very high due to low tra"c on its network. Its termination cost would not 
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termination rates in 
Europe
Figure 7: MTC’s cost per minute (Source: MTC annual report 2008 and information submitted to NCC)
How far away termination rates were from cost of termination at the beginning of 2009 can be seen 
from Figure 7. MTC’s total expenditure for the financial year ending September 2008 divided by call 
volume was less than the MTR at the time.





Telecom Namibia’s estimated cost of termination







Mobile termination cost per minute in ZAR/N$
Figure 8: Cost of termination in N$/ZAR
The average cost of termination was estimated to be in the region of N$/ZAR 0.23-0.35 (figure 8). 
Australia has nearly identical population density to Namibia and used a model with 96% population 
coverage but only 44% market share. MTC had 87% market share and 95% population coverage. 
The figures for Australia should therefore be comparable with Namibia. Higher labour and site costs 
in Australia should be o!set by more minutes used per user compared to Namibia.
Namibia’s Benchmarking Model
The principles for the Namibian benchmark model, in line with international best practice and 
international trends, were:
• termination rates should be close to the cost of an e"cient operator;
• cost of termination is determined based on benchmarking the cost of termination in 
jurisdictions that implemented accounting separation or other means to establish the cost 
of termination;
• termination rates should be technologically and service neutral in line with Namibia’s ICT 
policies and the anticipated telecommunications bill;
• termination rates should facilitate emergence of IP-based next generation networks (NGNs); 
and
• recommendations should be implemented in terms of the current licence conditions and 
acts.
The recommendation that emerged from these principles and the cost estimates was that the new 
termination target rate should be N$0.30. This was based on the cost of termination of the most 
e"cient operator (MTC) plus 25% mark-up. The four models that were discussed with all operators 
were:
• Model 1: Immediate drop to N$0.30 starting 1 July 2009
• Model 2: Symmetric glide path to N$0.30 that started 1 July 2006
• Model 3: Symmetric glide path to N$0.30 starting 1 July 2009
• Model 4: Asymmetric glide path to N$0.30 starting 1 July 2009
MTR before 1 July 2009
Total expenditure per minute
Opex per minute
Direct cost and depreciation per minute
Direct cost per minute
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Models 1 and 2 were compromise models from the side of Leo and Telecom Namibia. For Leo these 
models needed to be complemented by other regulatory interventions. MTC and Leo were both 
uncomfortable with setting the termination rate at the cost of an e"cient operator, and both 
mentioned that they might prefer a LRIC study in the longer run. Telecom Namibia wished to have 
higher termination rates for outgoing international calls due to costs of the international gateway. 
Table 9 summarises the responses of operators.
Table 9: Summary of operator comments
Leo Telecom Namibia MTC
Model 1: 
Immediate drop 




path to N$0.30 




path to N$0.30 




path to N$0.30 









2nd choice: Removing 
distortionary factors immediately, 
but request higher transit charge 
for outgoing international calls
No comment




1st choice: Compensates for 
market distortions of past years
No comment
Rejected: sees no 
reason to wait to 
remove market 
distorting factors
Rejected: only gradually removes 
market distortions and 
disadvantages TN and consumers 
unjustifiably for two years longer
No comment
1st choice: because 
of current tra"c 
imbalance
Rejected: only gradually removes 
market distortions and 
disadvantages TN and consumers 
unjustifiably for two years longer
No comment
Rejected: sees no 
reason to wait to 
remove market 
distorting factors
Rejected: only gradually removes 
market distortions and 
disadvantages TN and consumers 
unjustifiably for two years longer
Drop in EBITDA 
margin to 37% 
because of having 
to compete on a 
level playing field
In the end operators agreed to a compromise  model (Table 10) with advantages for all operators:
• Immediate drop of termination rates to N$0.60 to catch up with the region and 
international developments;
• Immediate converged termination rates;
• Glide path to the estimated cost of an e"cient operator; and
• Immediate fixed-mobile convergence of termination rates.
Table 10: Compromise Model
Current 1 July 2009 1 January 
2010
1 July 2010 1 January 
2011
MTR 1.06 0.60 0.50 0.40 0.30




locally via Telecom 
Namibia
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This meant that MTC and Leo had time to conduct LRIC studies and contest the results of the cost 
estimate of this study if they wished to do so. Telecom Namibia benefited from similar fixed 
termination rates as the current ones for six months while mobile termination rates were lowered. 
The compromise model also provided room for the NCC to monitor market development and 
assess further regulatory interventions to safeguard fair competition. At the same time as the 
interconnection dispute was resolved the international voice monopoly of Telecom Namibia was 
ended by issuing international voice licences to Leo and MTC. 
Consequences of Termination Rate Reduction
During the termination rate debate in 2009 MTC argued that its EBITDA (earning before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation) margin would drop to 36% if termination rates were reduced to the 
cost of an e"cient operator. The termination rates have since dropped to N$ 0.5 from N$ 1.06 while 
MTC’s EBIDTA margin rose from 50.9% in 2008 to 53.8% in 2009. The financial year ending 
September 2009 only covers 3 month after the first termination rate drop. The 2010 financial report 
will reveal more. One thing is clear however; MTC will invest more not less as threatened since the 
lower termination rates will lead to fairer competition and hence the need to stay ahead of the 
field. MTC announced in its 2009 financial report investments into 4G technology (LTE =Long Term 
Evolution) investments of N$180 million and N$ 115 million into the West African Cable System.
Table 11: MTC key performance indicators
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Subscribers 403,743 555,501 743,509 1,008,658 1,283,530
EBITDA Margin 61% 60.2% 52.2% 50.9% 53.8%
After-tax profit million N$ 292.9 337.2 339.6 356.2 387.5
Dividend paid in million N$ 110 80 245 221 370
Dividend payment as share of after 
tax profit
37.6% 23.7% 72.1% 62.0% 95.5%
Also remarkable is that MTC’s subscriber numbers increased further to nearly 1.3 million subscribers. 
Leo and Telecom Namibia also managed to attract new customers, indicating that the lower prices 
led to an expansion of the market.
Prices of MTC have equally not increased as predicted but have instead decreased or remained the 
same. Figure 8 shows the cost of OECD usage bundles for the cheapest postpaid or prepaid 
product of MTC. The prices for Tango Prepaid per second prices were slashed by more than half in 
December 2009, and a new, substantially cheaper postpaid product was introduced in early 2010, 
e!ectively reducing MTC prices again. Telecom Namibia and LEO also o!ered new products and 
cheaper prices.
Figure 9: MTC cheapest product (prepaid and post paid for OECD usage baskets (2006) definition) in N$/
ZAR
Figure 10 shows the cost of the OECD low user basket prior to and after two termination rate 
reductions for MTC. None of MTC’s product increased in price. The OECD basket methodology does 
not capture recent specials and promotions run by MTC such as 100 free SMS and doubling up of 
prepaid airtime, which reduce the cost of usage as well.
Sep-05 Dec-08 May-10 May-10 (2005 prices)
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Figure 10: Cost of OECD low user basket in N$/ZAR for MTC
Telecom Namibia not only reduced its o!-net rates following the termination rate reductions but 
also on-net prices leading to prepaid prices for the cost of the low user bundle in March 2010 being 
only a third of the April 2008 figure.
Figure 11: Cost of OECD low user basket in N$/ZAR for Telecom Namibia
Leo restructured its product o!erings and added nine new postpaid products. The new postpaid 
products are di!erent in nature and cannot be compared to the basket price of the postpaid 
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The dominant operator 




products prior to the termination rate cuts. Figures 12 and 13 thus display postpaid and prepaid 
calling rates directly. None of the tari!s increased. This shows that there is clearly no waterbed 
e!ect in Namibia.
Figure 12: Leo’s Postpaid rates compared
Figure 13: Leo’s Prepaid rates compared
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Conclusion
This policy paper has provided evidence that the mobile termination market must be regulated as 
a result of its inherent monopolistic characteristics and that incumbent mobile operators’ 
arguments in support of the status quo are self-serving. Termination rates should be prescribed on 
the basis of the costs of an e"cient operator. This cap needs to be re-evaluated regularly since new 
technologies reduce costs and increasing demand for voice and data increases the economies of 
scale and hence also lower costs.
The case of Namibia demonstrates how benchmarking can be used to increase fairness in 
competition among operators, and that regulatory interventions can lead to cheaper prices, more 
subscribers and more investment. A waterbed e!ect could not be observed following any of the 
termination rate reductions since 1 July 2009. It also showed how a bottleneck can be overcome 
relatively quickly and inexpensively by using alternative regulatory strategies such as 
benchmarking, and by placing the burden of contestation onto operators that have the relevant 
data, skills and resources to contest the benchmarks if they feel they are unjustified. 
Further regulatory interventions may be required to allow operators to compete fairly. O!-net rates 
are typically higher than on-net rates. That does not need to be the case any longer once the 
termination rate is set to the cost of an e"cient operator. A regulatory intervention requiring 
symmetric o!-net/on-net tari!s would remove a potential bias from network size in a country.
The case study of Namibia further demonstrates that there is no ‘waterbed e!ect’. This is 
demonstrated by examining the impact of this regulatory intervention on retail prices using the 
OECD pricing basket methodology across all services and products.. It highlights the importance of 
policy makers and regulators assessing the likely consequences of regulatory interventions for their 
own country, than knowing how their country compares to other countries. In this respect case 
studies are more likely to be useful that cross-country studies or panel data studies for this purpose.
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